Darfur Peace Agreement (Dpa)
Julian Hottinger explains the context of the conflict in Darfur and the evolution of the AU-led peace process in Abuja. He highlights some of the problems encountered during the Abuja talks: on the one hand, Sudan`s regional peace processes were addressed independently of each other, each insurgent group expected a separate quasi-CPA, while the CPA itself granted significant restrictions on what could be agreed. The 2011 Darfur Peace Agreement, also known as the Doha Agreement, was signed in July 2011 between the Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement. The agreement created a compensation fund for victims of the Darfur conflict, allowed the Sudanese president to appoint a vice-president of Darfur, and created a new Darfur regional agency to monitor the region until a referendum could determine its permanent status in the Republic of Sudan.  The agreement also provided for power-sharing at the national level: the movements that sign the agreement have the right to appoint two ministers and two ministers of state at the federal level and to appoint 20 members to the national legislative power. The movements will have the right to appoint two governors in the Darfur region.  Buffer zones should be set up around IDP camps and humanitarian aid corridors. A commission has been set up to cooperate with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return home. The agreement stated that the Sudanese government would provide $30 million in compensation to the victims of the conflict. The discussions in Abuja were complicated. Trust between and within games was very low, and the GoS team was stronger, had a better understanding of the process, and held most of the cards.
Long after the split between Abdelwahid Mohamed en-Nour and Minni Arkou Minnawi, the AU acted as a party and only recognized the two factions as separate parties to the negotiations in December 2005. Among the causes of the division were tribal confrontations between the Fur and Zaghawa, the personal ambition of the rulers, the influence of a jem zaghawa most often, and disagreements over how or whether negotiations should continue. Perhaps led by the AU, the international community was uncertain about how to handle mlS/A`s domestic politics, especially in a climate where both sides had broken ceasefire agreements and at least some Elements of the GoS were now „the good guys” who had signed the CPA. Indeed, similar differences between military and political leaders in the Beja Congress at the same time hampered efforts to begin negotiations for a political solution in eastern Sudan, which stalled in 2005. How has the Darfur Peace Agreement (ODA) contributed to preventing peace? This article from the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics examines the negotiation process that took place between November 2005 and May 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, and culminated in the signing of the DPA. It argues that the deadlines imposed by officials and the intransigence of the parties during the talks prevented effective mediation and contributed to the DPA`s failure to achieve peace. An end to civil wars requires patience and peace agreements must be designed and owned by the parties, not imposed on them.